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                                Overreaching—Getting the Right Balance 
Gwilym Owen* and Dermot Cahill**Australia; Canada; The Republic of 
Ireland; Beneficial interests; Registration of trusts; Comparative Law; Land 
Registration; Legal history; Overreaching 
                          
                                                          INTRODUCTION 
In land law overreaching is a defence mechanism which protects purchasers against the rights 
of beneficiaries under trusts of land, enabling purchasers to take free from such trusts. There 
are various defences available to purchasers against other incumbrances affecting land, and 
these vary according to whether the land is registered or unregistered. As unregistered land 
‘has had its day’1 this article will only consider the concept of overreaching in the context of 
registered land transactions. Overreaching forms part of a much wider framework for the 
protection of purchasers from incumbrances following transfers of land. It forms part of a 
fulcrum in the seesaw which attempts to balance out the competing aims of ensuring that land 
should be a dynamic security on the one hand, with the protection of static security inherent 
in the broader structure of land law on the other hand.2 There is currently an imbalance, 
insofar as the defence of overreaching is concerned, in favour of the purchaser at the expense  
of the beneficiary (i.e. between dynamic and static security), and the scales need resetting in 
order to achieve a fairer equilibrium. The article will suggest that this could be achieved by 
either making trusts of land registrable, or alternatively, by way of an additional form of 
restriction to the standard forms of restrictions currently available. With regards to the 
suggestion for making trusts of land registerable, the article should be viewed as forming   
part of a broader debate concerning the registration of trusts. Of course, overreaching in land 
                                                          
1 Law Commission Report No 271, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution 
(2001, [1.5]-[1.10]). 
2 Static security “protects the rights of existing owners at the expense, if necessary, of purchasers. See 
O’Connor, “Registration of Title in England and Australia” in Modern Studies in Property Law: Vol 2 (ed 
Cooke, 2003), pp84-85. 
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law is not the only defence mechanism in registered land transactions which has its problems 
in striking the right balance between competing interests. The Register may be altered for the 
purpose of correcting a mistake, giving rise to narrow and wide views of mistake. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to articulate a better theory for balancing out competing 
interests in respect of the various defence mechanisms. Rather, this article will concentrate on 
the single defence mechanism of overreaching in registered land transactions, and the 
authors’ suggestions as to how a better balance could be achieved. It is for others to consider 
whether the suggestions made in this article to reform the doctrine, insofar as registered land 
is concerned, could be incorporated into a wider theoretical framework to evaluate better the 
protection of rights in both registered and unregistered land transactions. It could well be the 
case that the concept of overreaching may prove to be anomalous in any such scheme, in 
which case the question arises as to whether or not we need overreaching at all. 
Therefore, the two aims of this article are: (1) to address the fundamental question of whether 
we should abandon the operation of the doctrine of overreaching altogether; and, if the 
doctrine should not be abandoned, (2) to determine: (a) the need for suggesting changes to the 
existing concept of overreaching, and if there is such a need, (b) to explore suggestions for 
resetting the balance between dynamic and static security in the context of overreaching in 
registered land transactions. These suggestions raise contentious issues. For instance, the  
suggestion for the registration of trusts of land would mean breaching the curtain principle 
and effectively give rise to the abandonment of overreaching in situations where such trusts 
had been registered on the title (but overreaching would still take place in the absence of 
registration), as would an alternative suggestion to control the mechanism by way of consent 
restrictions. For the reasons which will be advanced in the article, the authors consider that 
trusts of land should be registrable in this jurisdiction and that this argument should be 
viewed in the context of a broader debate which go goes beyond the discrete topic of 
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overreaching. The authors will contend that an alternative scheme can be proposed based 
upon the provision of better restrictions being added to the existing suite of land registry 
restrictions which would preserve the doctrine of overreaching. The Law Commission has 
stated that it is not currently considering reforms to the doctrine of overreaching in its current 
consultation in respect of the reform of land registration, but it may do so at some point in the 
future.3 The Law Commission has recently opened its 13th Programme of law reform, and is 
seeking views on areas of law which would benefit from reform. That is why this article is 
being written at this point, and the authors will argue that there is a pressing need to reform 
the operation of the doctrine of overreaching in registered land transactions.  
In undertaking this task, the article will begin by analysing certain aspects of the history of 
overreaching, which is linked with the early land registration Acts in England and Wales. 
This is necessary as this historical analysis will illustrate the features which the early 
legislation was trying to capture in respect of land law reform. These features will form the 
benchmark against which an evaluation will be undertaken in addressing each of the two 
main aims of this article. The historical analysis will demonstrate that the early legislation 
was not trying to capture any features concerning the use of a property primarily as a home. 
Further, the historical background will show the reason why overreaching developed and why 
we still need it today but in a modified form to take into account modern trends and 
developments.  
In analysing the two questions which the article seeks to answer, the juxtaposition between 
the current system in England and Wales and other common law countries will be examined. 
In seeking an answer to the first question the article will consider an alternative scheme, 
based upon Australian and Canadian Torrens title. Those systems are not affected by the 
                                                          
3 Law Commission, Updating the Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 227, 
2016), [1.20]. 
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complexities inherent in the doctrine of overreaching in England and Wales. In Australian 
and Canadian Torrens title, if the beneficial interest is not protected as a caveat, the interest 
may be lost. For all its faults, it will be argued that the rules concerning overreaching in 
England and Wales are preferable to such an outcome. The article will adduce new evidence 
to demonstrate that had the first attempts at land registration in this jurisdiction continued 
unchecked we could have ended up with a land registration system similar to Australian and 
Canadian Torrens title. The article will also consider the position in relation to the 
registration of inhibitions in the Republic of Ireland. 
In considering the second question, the issue of the registration of trusts in land titles will be 
addressed. Comparisons with the Canadian Torrens system will be made along with 
European Directives aimed at making trusts more transparent. The issue of transparency is 
very relevant having regard to the current climate which seeks to engender more 
transparency in business affairs, and this theme will be considered in the article. This is a 
slow moving area of the law but the concept of overreaching lies at the very core of our 
system of land law, and as such, it is deserving of serious consideration.  
                              1. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF OVERREACHING 
                           SEEKING TO FIND THE EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
1 The three key elements 
The early history of overreaching shows that there were three key elements which were 
important in the development of what came to be known as the curtain principle. “ This 
principle says that a curtain is drawn across the register against any trusts.  Hence […] the 
register does not record beneficial ownership of land.” 4  The rationale of the principle is to 
preserve dynamic security. Each of the elements comprising the curtain principle has a 
                                                          
4  Law Commission, Updating the Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation Paper ( Law Com CP No 227, 
2016), 2.8, p 18.  
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bearing on the themes being pursued in the dual aims of this article. The first key element 
was the conveyancing practice of suppressio veri (suppressing the truth): 
1.1 Suppressio veri 
Prior to the Statute of Wills 1540 it was not possible under the common law to devise land 
directly by will, and the concept of the use (the precursor to the trust) was in part developed 
to overcome this problem. This was achieved by a settlor transferring land inter vivos to 
people whom he could trust, who then held the legal estate to the use  for the settlor or 
another during his life, and then followed his later written instructions set out in a will.  As so 
much land was held in use prior to the Statute of Uses 1536, the question which needs to be 
answered is: what protection was there for purchasers/mortgagees from hidden uses on 
sales/mortgages. This answer to this question is important as it highlights the origins of the 
doctrine of notice and the methods which were devised to enable a purchaser to take free of 
equitable interests in order to preserve the dynamic security in land. This lies at the very core 
of overreaching.   
If a purchaser/mortgagee could show that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice of the use (the doctrine of notice), then he would take free of it.5 To that end, there 
developed the fictitious practice of suppressio veri. By this method, if a settlor empowered 
his trustees to sell/mortgage land, the relevant transfer would contain an untruthful recital to 
the effect that his trustees were the absolute owners of the property. Of course, everybody 
knew that this was not true but it provided the purchaser/mortgagee with an excuse for not 
making further enquiries so that he could say that he was not on notice. 6  
                                                          
5 For an early example of this concept, see Cardinal Beaufort’s Case (1453) B. & M. 95. 
6  J..S.Anderson, Lawyers and The Making of English Land Law 1832—1940, (Oxford, 1992), 266-280.                                                  
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This practice had been a part of the common law in England and Wales for centuries.7  There 
was the possibility that a dishonest trustee could make off with the proceeds of sale, which 
the common law recognised, but it was a policy decision to adopt this approach.8 This 
historical fact is important as it was this policy consideration which led to the two trustee rule 
in Settled Land transactions which is considered in 1.3 below, and which subsequently found 
its way into the Law of Property Act 1925. 9 It was considered that fraud would be less likely 
in cases involving two trustees than in cases in which there was only one trustee.  
1.2 Caveats/cautions 
The second key element in the development of the curtain principle was the introduction of 
the caveat/caution.10 We have already observed that a purchaser/mortgagee took free from 
any trusts as long as he could show that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice. This is what Anderson describes as ‘book law’11, and explains that it was the doctrine 
of notice in respect of trusts which had been the problem with investigating title.12 As we 
shall see in 2.2 below, because what was proposed in respect of land registration involved 
changing the substantive law (i.e., the doctrine of notice), there had to be safeguards for the 
beneficiary; ‘[s]ave under the purest ‘mirror of title’ schemes, title registration demanded 
more, requiring the registration of at least caveats’.13 
It was because the substantive law was changed that caveats, and later cautions, were 
introduced in order to provide protection for the beneficiary of the equitable interest to enable 
him/her to be heard on an application which might defeat that beneficiary’s interest. 
                                                          
7 See distum of Chitty J in Carrit v Real and Personal Advance Company (1889) L.R. 42 Ch.D. at  p272. 
8 See dictum of Younger J  in Re Soden and Alexander’s Contract, [1918] 2 Ch.258 at p 263. 
9 Sections 2(1) and 27 LPA 1925. 
 
10 A caveat, later to be named a caution, was a procedure whereby a beneficiary of an interest under a trust was 
warned of a dealing which might affect his or her interest. 
11 J. S Anderson, Lawyers and The Making of English Land Law, 93. 
12 Ibid, 267. 
13 Ibid 93. 
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Caveats/cautions were an integral part of what later came to be known as the curtain 
principle. 
1.3 Settled Land Act 1882 
The problems associated with the practice of suppressio veri, detailed in 1.1, were an 
important reason why the legislature introduced the two-trustee rule in the Settled Land Act 
1882.14 This Act  brought about two major reforms: (1) empowering the tenant for life to sell 
the settled property or part thereof and (2) the process whereby the purchaser got clean title 
free from the Settled Land trusts by the requirement that the purchase monies were paid to at 
least two of the Settled Land trustees, and as we have seen the latter condition was a reaction 
to some of the abuses in the practice of suppressio veri. 
The above discussion shows the early components of what came to be called the curtain 
principle. The conveyancing practice of suppressio veri is evidence of an early form of 
curtain to overcome the substantive law concerning the doctrine of notice. As will be 
explained in 2 below, the early Land Registration Acts proposed a change to the substantive 
law relating to the doctrine of notice. As a consequence, it was felt that the position of  
beneficiaries needed protecting–hence the proposals for their protection by the entry of 
caveats/cautions to offset the curtailment of the doctrine of notice. 
 The final component, the requirement of two trustees to allow overreaching to take effect, w, 
which was first introduced in the Settled Land Act 1882, was the last ingredient in the early 
form of the curtain principle. The discussion now turns to consider in more detail how these 
elements developed. 
2 Early attempts at land registration and development of the curtain principle 
                                                          
14 Section 39 Settled Land Act 1882.  
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2.1 Steps leading up to the early Land Registration Acts 
There had been much discussion as far back as the 1830s and 1840s as to whether there 
should be a deeds register or a land registry, and for the purposes of this article it is important 
to understand the difference between the two, namely that a deeds bank was a repository from 
which the vailidity of a title could be inferred, whereas the latter contained a register of 
conclusions. 15 
 
It was the register in the land registration system which ultimately became the curtain. 
Even during these early times the issue of how to protect beneficial owners was a prime 
concern.  The Amendment Society Real Property Committee in 1846 proposed that 
equitable interests could be protected as claims.16 In Lord Cranworth’s Bill of 1853, it 
was provided that beneficiaries under trusts would have to protect their interests, or lose 
them, but the machinery for implementing this was not detailed.17 The 1857 Royal 
Commission’s Report concluded that ‘title registration…required at least the registration 
of caveats.’18  
2.2 The Transfer of Land and Declaration of Title Acts 1862 
The first attempt at land registration in this jurisdiction was Lord Westbury’s Transfer of 
Land and Declaration of Title Acts 1862. Both Acts were passed in 1862 and the intention 
was that they would work in tandem with each other. It is the authors’ view that the 
Declaration of Titles Acts 1862 marked an important step in the development of the modern 
                                                          
15 J. S Anderson, Lawyers and The Making of English Land Law, 65. 
16 Ibid, 69. 
17 Ibid, 83. See Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on the Registration of Assurances Bill, 
(1852-3) HCP xxxvi. 397. See also J.S. Anderson, Lawyers and The Making of English Land Law, 76-77. 
18 Ibid, 93. 
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concept of overreaching.19 There are two points to be noted about these Acts for the purposes 
of this article. Firstly, both Acts appear to have drawn inspiration from Australian Torrens 
title as evidenced by reference to the wording ‘indefeasible title’ in the recital to the 
Declaration of Title Act 1862. All interests not included within the declaration were 
effectively overreached after the obtaining of the declaration of title by the court, to enable 
the seller to make title. To that end, s 35 of the Declaration of Title Act 1862 provided that 
those interests not so included in the declaration were converted into the proceeds of sale.  
Secondly, and most importantly, it was the legislature’s intention to provide a landowner with 
the opportunity of being heard on an application which may have defeated his or her interest. 
Although a beneficial interest under a trust was not capable of registration, section 35 of the 
Transfer of Land Act 1862 provided for the protection of beneficial interests under trusts as 
claims by way of a ‘caveat’ (again note the influence of Australian Torrens title by the 
adoption of the wording ‘caveat’).20 However, the introduction of caveats had been opposed 
by Wolstenholme at this point (he later changed his mind), and this proved to be a 
contentious issue. 
This attempt at land registration proved to be a failure, and a similar fate awaited the Land 
Transfer Act 1875.  
2.3 Events following the Land Transfer Act 1875 
In 1886 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen proposed the abolition of real property law and that all 
property should be personalty. In his National Review 21 he said thatland and houses would 
never be ‘sold like stock until land becomes, so to speak, a mere right, an abstract idea, like 
                                                          
19 P. Sparkes, “Declarations of title: 1883 and all that”, Conv. 2016, 2 118-137 at p134. Sparkes has pointed out 
that the 1862 Acts were the first time that the concept of overreaching had been utilised in a statute. However   
overreaching is a common law concept and had been in existence long before the 1862 legislation.  
20 For the form of notice, see R.D. Urlin and T Key, op cit, form V p 71. 
21 ‘The Laws Relating to Land’, National Review, 6 (Feb.1886) 
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stock or shares.’22 Much land in England and Wales was sold after World War I, a process 
which had begun in the 1890s.23 Landowners had to restructure their wealth, and there was a 
move from land to funds as agriculture was in depression.24 As the discussion will go on to 
show, it was this perception of land which was prevalent when the Law of Property Act 1925 
was enacted. That perception does not sit well with our perceptions of land in the twenty first 
century, and is an important reason for calling for reform of the law in this area.  
 
2.4 Haldane’s 1915 Bill 
It became clear that the rights of beneficiaries under trusts had become caught up in a tangle 
concerning theoretical distinctions between realty and personalty. 25 Ultimately, Haldane 
aligned himself with Wolstenholme’s proposal that beneficial interests (named Subordinate 
Estates) would be overreached on sale unless they were protected as cautions or inhibitions 
on the register.26 Haldane’s 1915 Bill was read in the House of Lords on 26 July 1915 and 
drew upon Wolstenholme’s proposal for the protection of beneficiaries by way of cautions 
and inhibitions. However, this proposal was rejected by a Select Committee which was 
appointed in January 1919 ‘to consider the present position of Land Transfer in England and 
Wales, and to advise what action should be taken to facilitate and cheapen the Transfer of 
Land’. Its recommendations included Cherry’s Bill. 
                                                          
22 Anderson, Lawyers and The Making of English Land Law, 174. 
23 For more on this topic, see M Cragoe and P.Readman,, The Land Question in Britain, 1750-1950 (London, 
2010). For the Welsh perspective see K.O.Morgan, Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880-1980 (Cardiff/Oxford, 
1981). For the land reform debate see I.Packer, Lloyd George, Liberalism and the land: The Land issue and 
party politics in England, 1906-14 (London, 2001), 178-93. 
 
24 See F.M.L. Thompson (1990)– Presidential Address: English Landed Society in the Twentieth Century: 
Collapse and Survival, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 40, pp 1-24, esp. pages 13, 14 and 23.  
 
25 Anderson, Lawyers and The Making of English Land Law, 254. 
26 Ibid, 255. 
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2.5 The Land Acquisition Committee Report November 1919 27 
Instead of the protection of cautions and inhibitions proposed by Wolstenholme’s and 
Haldane’s Bills, Cherry argued that beneficiaries should be protected unless the purchase 
money was paid to two trustees in which case their interests would be overreached. He felt 
that there was less likelihood of fraud in the case of two as opposed to one trustee. For the 
very first time we see in the 1919 Select Committee Report express reference to the curtain 
principle as ‘Principle C’ in Appendix IV of the 1919 Select Committee Report.  
Cherry’s Bill drew heavily on Haldane’s 1915 Bill but without setting up a register of 
cautions and inhibitions.28  There then appeared The Law of Property Bill (1920) containing 
Cherry’s universal curtain principle. 29 So far the discussion has concentrated on the care 
which was taken by the early land registration Acts to protect the static interests in land. 
Cherry’s curtain principle was aimed at protecting the dynamic nature in land transactions. 
The provisions dealing with overreaching are now contained in sections 2 and 27 of the Law 
of Property Act 1925 to which reference has been made previously in section 1.3 above. 
Whereas these latter provisions do not expressly refer to a curtain, one is definitely implied.30 
2.6 The Land Registration Act 1925 
Sections 53 to 57 of the Land Registration Act 1925 made provision for the entry of cautions 
in registered land transactions which provisions were repealed by the Land Registration Act 
2002. Section 58 of the Land Registration Act 1925 also provided for the entry of restrictions. 
It seems that it was not entirely clear whether the interests of beneficial interests under trusts 
were meant to be protected by cautions or by way of restrictions prior to the Land 
                                                          
27 1919 [Cmd.424] Fourth report of the Acquisition and Valuation of Land Committee on the transfer of land in 
England and Wales. 
28 Ibid, section 25. 
29 HLP v. 323. 
30 Anderson, Lawyers and The Making of English Land Law, 309. 
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Registration Act 2002. In Flegg,31 Mr and Mrs Flegg eventually ‘protected’ their beneficial 
interests by way of a caution, but at the beginning of his judgment Lord Oliver implies that 
this should have been achieved by entering a restriction.32 
2.7 The evaluative criteria 
From the above historical analysis we can see the tension between (1) the competing goals of 
land being a dynamic security, and, (2) the protection of static interests such as beneficial 
interests under trusts. Striking a balance between these competing claims has been an 
important feature which the legislature has been trying to capture since the very earliest 
attempts at land registration. In this regard, an important feature was the right of a beneficiary 
under a trust to be heard on a disposition which might defeat his or her interest, i.e., fairness. 
Another important feature was that the protection of the beneficiary was further reinforced by 
borrowing from the Settled Land Act 1882 the requirement that capital monies had to be paid 
to no fewer than two trustees for overreaching to take effect. It is also important to note that 
the early Land Registration Acts were enacted at a time when land was thought of more in 
terms of personalty rather than realty which was an important consideration for the legislature 
in reforming trusts for sale having regard to the position prior to the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. Therefore, it is correct to conclude that in 1925 the 
legislature was not trying to capture any features concerning the use of property primarily as 
a home. Now that the salient features have been identified, the first issue which needs to be 
settled is whether we should abandon the doctrine of overreaching altogether at the beginning 
of the twenty first century in view of the fact that it is a concept which was conceived at the 
beginning of the twentieth century to strike the right balance in the context of a different 
socio-economic background. The article now moves on to consider this matter from two 
                                                          
31 City of  London Building Society v Flegg [1988] A.C. 54 HL. 
32 Ibid, p 74. 
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perspectives: (1) by analysing alternative schemes by reference to the caveat system in 
Australian and Canadian Torrens title (the adoption of which would severely curtail the 
operation of the doctrine of overreaching), and the Irish system (the adoption of which would 
significantly modify the doctrine in this jurisdiction), and these will be examined in part II of 
the article; (2) whether overreaching should effectively be abandoned by providing for (a) 
trusts to be registered by way of a notice which would trump overreaching, which will be 
considered in part III of this article, or alternatively (b) restrictions which would require that 
a transaction could not be registered without the consent of the beneficiary, which will be 
considered in section 2.2 of part III of the article.33 
                                            II. ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES 
An obvious alternative model for consideration is the Australian caveat system. The reasons 
for this are threefold. Firstly, we have identified in 2.2 above that the earliest attempt at land 
registration in this jurisdiction was heavily influenced by the Australian Torrens system. 
Secondly, the complexities of the English concept of overreaching are absent in the 
Australian Torrens States and Territories. Thirdly, it is the authors’ view that had land 
registration developed in a different way in this jurisdiction following the Declaration of Title 
Acts 1862, we might well have ended up with a similar system of caveats which forms part  
of  Australian Torrens title. This would have meant that, unless protected as a claim by way 
of a caveat, the owner of a beneficial interest under a trust would have lost his or her interest 
on a disposition. The analysis now moves on to consider the Australian model.  
1. The Australian model  
                                                          
33 Notices protect priority if a triggering disposition is made under s 29 Land Registration Act 2002, whereas 
restrictions limit the circumstances in which a s 29 disposition can be made.  
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As in England and Wales, in the Australian States and Territories beneficial interests under 
trusts are not capable of registration. They can be protected merely as claims by way of a 
caveat on the register. A transfer cannot be registered until the court has been satisfied as to 
the validity and priority of the claim.34 The problem with caveats is that, in the absence of 
fraud, the equitable interest can be lost if it is not protected by way of a caveat, which has 
dire consequences for the owner of that interest. Leaving aside the decision in City of London 
Building Society v Flegg  (this case will be considered in Part III of the article) for the 
moment, in this jurisdiction the equitable interest would not be lost but would be 
overreached, and converted into the proceeds of sale. It is suggested that for all its faults this 
consequence is preferable to running the risk of losing the beneficial interest altogether, in the 
absence of protecting that interest as a claim by way of a caveat, which would be the position 
in the Australian system, and also the Canadian system which is considered next.35 
2. The Canadian model 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge information and belief, the only jurisdiction in which it 
is possible to register trusts is in British Columbia, and it is believed that any such trusts 
would have to be express rather than implied trusts.36 One reform option which will be 
considered in Part III of this article is the registration of both express and implied trusts. In 
practice, trusts are seldom registered in British Columbia in view of the fact that the transfer 
of legal title in British Columbia attracts property transfer tax, and the transfer of property 
into the name of a trustee would attract this tax. In the Canadian provinces with a Torrens 
                                                          
34 See G. Owen, ‘A New Paradigm for Overreaching—Some Inspiration from Down Under’, [2013] 77 Conv.     
    pp378-381. 
35 It should be acknowledged that in England and Wales a beneficiary could lose his beneficial interest within 
the priority provisions, where his interest is not technically overreached (e.g. a beneficiary holding under a 
single trustee, where the beneficiary is not in actual occupation when the seller sells to a purchaser in breach of 
trust). In this situation the proceeds would be held on (constructive) trust of the beneficiary, owing to the trustee 
not being able to take advantage of his own breach of trust. Whilst this is not explained by overreaching, the 
result is functionally the same.  
36 For British Columbia, see s 180 Land Title Act, R.S.B.C, c250.. See also, Di Castri, Registration of Title to 
Land, (Carswell 1987) 17-23 to 17-26.  
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land title system, as in the Australian States and Territories, the supersession of the beneficial 
interest by a transfer of the ‘uncaveated’ registered title to a purchaser for value takes place, 
in the absence of fraud, as a result of the operation of the relevant land title statute which 
obviates the need to look behind the register. 37   
In the Australian and Canadian Torrens systems there is more emphasis on the notion of 
dynamic security at the expense of static security, thereby creating an imbalance at the 
expense of those with beneficial interests. This is all very well as long as there are adequate 
safeguards for the owner of the static security. Overreaching provides that basic form of 
fairness in this jurisdiction, so the authors consider that the doctrine still has a role to play and 
that it should not be abandoned. However, the doctrine is in need of reform to deal with the 
unfairness which can arise in a case such as Flegg, and which is considered in part III. 
Essentially, the consequence of Flegg is that under certain circumstances, and where there is 
negative equity in a property, overreaching can have the effect whereby the owner of a 
beneficial interest under a trust can not only lose his or her home, but also end up with 
nothing from the proceeds of sale of the property in which that interest subsisted. This may 
be viewed as a consequence of English pragmatism. We rely on equity and possible breach of 
fiduciary duty to do the heavy work here, which is of no use to people faced with problems 
such as those which beset Mr and Mrs Flegg. Situations such as these should not be left to be 
resolved primarily by the rules of equity. The laws of real property need to provide a better 
solution.  Before considering how best to reform the doctrine in this jurisdiction, the Irish 
model will be considered. Whereas this model is not premised on abandoning overreaching, 
if implemented in England and Wales it would represent a significant difference from the 
English and Welsh concept of overreaching. 
                                                          
37 The authors are obliged to Greg Blue, Q.C., senior Staff Lawyer at British Columbia Law Institute for 
providing this information. 
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3. The Irish model 
Overreaching has proved to be an anomalous concept in practice in England and Wales.38 In 
the Republic of Ireland, the legislature has sought to overcome this by the entry of an 
inhibition and extending the operation of the doctrine of overreaching in respect of transfers 
by a single trustee in certain circumstances. Beneficial interests of beneficiaries are not 
capable of registration, but they can be protected by entering an inhibition.39 An inhibition 
protects unregistrable rights (e.g. beneficial interests under trusts) that cannot be converted 
into registered rights. In order to achieve this, the beneficiary has to demonstrate a prima 
facie right or interest and any disputes concerning this are determined by the court. Therefore, 
the registration of an inhibition validates the beneficiary’s claim and no purchaser would 
proceed without the matter being dealt with before completion.40 However, overreaching still 
takes effect in the case of a transfer by two trustees, but overreaching is restricted in certain 
circumstances in the case of the transfer by a single trustee.41In short, the interests of a 
beneficiary in discoverable actual occupation would not be overreached if there were one 
trustee, but they would be overreached, even if there were a single trustee, if the beneficiary 
were not in discoverable actual occupation. 42 
 
Before dealing with suggestions for reform, the next question which needs to be settled is: if 
overreaching is desirable in this jurisdiction, why do we need any reform to overreaching at 
all? Flegg was a hard case but as hard cases such as this only come along every so often, why 
                                                          
38 For an explanation of the anomalies, see G. Owen, “A New Paradigm for Overreaching—Some Inspiration 
from Down Under”, [2013] 77 Conv., 380-381. 
39 G. Owen, ‘A New Model for Overreaching—Some Historical Inspiration’, 236. See also. Section 98 of the 
Irish Republic’s Registration of Title Act 1964. 
40 The Irish Property Registration Authority has power to remove the inhibition. 
41 Section 21(1) of the Irish Republic’s Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009. 
42 A similar scheme has been proposed for Northern Ireland. For a criticism of these proposals, see G.Owen, “A 
New Model for Overreaching—Some Historical Inspiration”, [2015] 79 Conv., 237-238 
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not just maintain the status quo? The first named author has considered this question in 
previous work, and this article will proceed on the basis that hard cases do matter and that the 
seeds are there for factual circumstances as were seen in Flegg to increase rather than 
decrease in the future, based upon the reasoning in that previous work. 43  
                                            III. RESETTING THE BALANCE 
By way of an overview, this part of the article will consider various options for resetting the 
balance to achieve a better equilibrium between the competing interests of dynamic and static 
security in the context of overreaching in registered land transactions against the background 
of the evaluative criteria identified in 2.7 above. In view of the unfairness which can be 
caused to a beneficiary inherent in Australian and Canadian Torrens title arising out of the 
operation of caveats, the possibility of registering trusts will be considered. It should not be 
forgotten that Robert Torrens originally felt that there should be registration of trusts and 
what came to be known as the curtain principle did not form part of his original proposals in 
the Australian Torrens system of land registration.44 On this proposal for England and Wales, 
overreaching would only kick in if the trust (express or implied) had not been registered. As 
will be discussed, the registration proposal would involve an amendment in England and 
Wales to s 33 (a) Land Registration Act 2002 to provide that trusts can be registered. In this 
respect, the article will consider whether any such notices should or should not trump 
overreaching. Finally, the suggestion that the overreaching doctrine should be controlled 
through the use of different forms of restriction will be considered as an alternative to the 
proposal for the registration of trusts. 
1 The registration of trusts 
                                                          
43 G. Owen, ‘A New Paradigm for Overreaching’ and  ‘A New Model for  Overreaching’. 
44 Stein, ‘Torrens Title—A Case for The Registration of Trusts in New South Wales’, [1982] 9(3) Sydney Law 
Review, 605 and 608. 
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1.1 The arguments against registration 
“English law appears resistant to attempts to curtail the curtain principle through which trusts 
are kept off the register.”45 There are three main arguments against the registration of trusts: 
(1) if registration of trusts were to be permitted this would lead to the register becoming 
clogged with entries. These would have to be dealt with on every disposition which would 
lead to a slowing down of the conveyancing process leading to delays and expense. In short, 
it would take us back to the pre-1925 position; (2)  beneficiaries of implied trusts may not 
have the necessary knowledge in respect of their interests to know that they were capable of 
registration; (3) even if beneficiaries did have the requisite knowledge, they would not wish 
to register as it may be regarded as a hostile act. Objections (2) and (3) have been dealt with 
in previous work. 46 What will be addressed in this article is objection (1). 
1.2 Further arguments in favour of registration 
It is proposed to deal with objection (1) by reference to three different issues in the manner 
set out hereunder after which a proposal will be made for regulating the overreaching defence 
mechanism through the registration of trusts, before considering the alternative method by 
means of restrictions: 
1.2.1 The relevant underlying economic background at the time when the early Land 
Registration Acts and the 1925 Law of Property legislation were enacted 
It has already been noted that the early Land Registration Acts and the Law of Property Act 
1925 were enacted against an economic background of a restructuring of portfolios from land 
to funds. Further, home ownership at that time was not as prevalent as it is now.47 At the 
                                                          
45 McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield, Land Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 671. 
46 G Owen, “A New Paradigm for Overreaching—Some Inspiration from Down Under” [2013] 77 Conv. 377, 
pp 391-394. 
47 G Owen, ‘A New Model for Overreaching’[2015] 79 Conv. 226-239. 
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beginning of the last century trusts were viewed as a hybrid of realty and personalty. Cherry’s 
overreaching provisions were formulated against this socio-economic background, But this 
did not matter in a climate when land was regarded as more of an investment rather than a 
home.  
1.2.2 Should trusts be more transparent? 
The issue of the registration of trusts for land was a peripheral topic in the debates concerning 
proposals by the European Union Parliament in 2014 to add onto the 3rd Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive 48 a requirement for a public register of trusts.49 However, some of the 
matters which were discussed in those debates can profitably inform our understanding of the 
issues discussed in this article. 
In March 2014 the European Parliament published proposals the effect of which would have 
been to require Member States to set up a public register of trusts as part of its drive to 
combat money laundering. If implemented in accordance with the original proposals, trustees 
would have been required to register private details concerning trusts, and there were 
concerns that this could have extended to trusts for land. This would really only have affected 
those Member States with common law jurisdictions, as the concept of the trust is not a 
feature of civil law based systems. The proposals met with fierce resistance in the United 
Kingdom on the basis that such transparency was seen as a way of eroding privacy.50 In the 
event, the Fourth Money Laundering Directive51 which was eventually adopted on 20 May 
2015 was less extensive in scope than was originally feared and the ‘mandatory register of 
                                                          
48 Directive 2005/60 on the protection of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
and terrorist financing [2005] OJ L309/15 art.3. 
49 This is similar in concept to a deeds registry. 
50 See, F. Noseda, ‘For or against the registration of trusts-why it matters:balancing regulatory concerns and the 
right to privacy,’ Private Client Business, 2014, 3, 137—141.  
51 Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering or terrorist funding, amending Regulation (EU) no 648/2012 and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC  
and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L141/73. 
20 
 
trusts applies only to taxable trusts and it will not be public.’52 However, the debates which 
took place in connection with the passing of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive 
highlighted the distrust that there is in Europe towards the concept of the trust, which is 
regarded in civil jurisdictions as shady and underhand.53   
Whereas the authors would not subscribe to the misguided views held by some in Europe 
concerning trusts in this jurisdiction, they do feel that the debates highlighted the need to 
revisit the need for transparency in certain areas concerning our trust laws.54 At present we do 
not have any means by which beneficiaries under a trust can be heard on a disposition which 
could affect their interests. This is a basic human right and beneficiaries under trusts may be 
being deprived of that right in England and Wales. Rather, they have the dubious protection 
of the registration of a restriction.  
The authors suggest that the lack of an opportunity for beneficiaries to be heard on an 
application for registration which might defeat their interests may form the basis for a 
challenge in the future under Articles 1 (deprivation of rights) and/or 8 (respect for the 
home) of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
task looks difficult but may not be impossible. 55  
 
                                                          
52 See STEP article, http://www.step.org/full-text-fourth-european-aml- 
directivepublished#sthash.z.1W1Edr7&st_ref. Accessed, 31 January 2016. 
53 See, F. Noseda, ‘For or against the registration of trusts-why it matters..,’ 137.  
54 Although concerning companies and not individuals, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
issued a discussion paper in March 2016 entitled, ‘Enhancing transparency of beneficial ownership information 
of foreign companies undertaking certain economic activities in the UK,’: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/505546/bis-16-161-
beneficial-ownership-transparency.pdf. Accessed on 16 March 2016: see, Law Commission, Updating the 
Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 227, 2016), [1.22]. 
 
55For an analysis of Article 1, see A. Goymour, ‘Property & Housing’ in The Impact of the UK Human Rights 
Act on Private Law (ed Hoffman, Cambridge: CUP, 2011) ch 12 pp 281-4; for an analysis of Article 8, see, 
Nield, ‘Article 8 Respect  for the Home: A Human Property Right’ (2003) 24 KLJ 147, p169. 
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1.2.3 The proposal for regulating the overreaching defence mechanism through the 
registration of trusts 
It is probably unrealistic to propose an amendment to s 27 Land Registration Act 2002 to 
provide for the substantive registration of trusts.56 This would meet with objection from the 
Land Registry as substantive registration would create a legal interest, which would mean the 
state guarantee of title, which would bring in its wake indemnity issues. 
Another option would be to introduce a means of protection of both implied and express 
trusts by notice on the title register.  The Land Registry does not scrutinise the validity of an 
application to enter a notice. Unlike with substantive registration, a registered notice does not 
come within the provisions affecting the state guarantee of title. However, those applying for 
the entry of a notice have to be careful: as we have seen, section 77 of the Land Registration 
Act 2002 provides that if they do so without reasonable cause, they may be liable to a person 
who suffers damage as a consequence of the entry. 
At present, section 33 of the Land Registration Act 2002 prohibits the use of a notice to 
protect an interest under a trust of land. Consequently, an amendment to section 3357 of the 
Land Registration Act 2002 could be made to facilitate this. It then needs to be considered 
whether the proposed new form of notice would, or would not, trump overreaching.  A notice 
that survives overreaching would have to be cleared from the title with the consent of the 
beneficiary of it. Some would argue that this would slow down the conveyancing process, 
and would take us back to the pre-1925 position in respect of trusts.  
                                                          
56 An interest being substantively registrable would only be capable of being legal if also recognised as a legal 
interest by s 1 LPA 1925. Therefore, to make trusts substantively registrable would also entail making beneficial 
interests legal interests within that section, which would be antithetical to the nature of a trust as an equitable 
creation.  
57 Such rights would only be protected as claims and the act of registration would validate those claims. 
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Therefore, one option would be that the new form of notice should not trump overreaching. 
The question which then arises is: what would be the point of entering a notice which could 
effectively be ignored? By analogy with the old law relating to cautions, there may be some 
advantages. 
 In Kastner v Jason58 although it was ordered that the caution had to be vacated, the judge 
was of the view that but for the solicitor’s oversight in not informing the purchasers of the 
existence of the caution, the transaction would not have proceeded until the caution had been 
vacated. This would have meant a payment to the cautioner whose claim would, to all intents 
and purposes, have been protected.The above proposal would replicate this position.  
It is likely that a proposal whereby the notice would not trump overreaching would not find 
favour because it might fairly be said that it would not be robust enough upon which to base a 
solution to the overreaching mechanism, notwithstanding its goal of trying to get the parties 
to sort matters out at the outset, which sits well in the current climate of greater emphasis on 
alternative methods of dispute resolution. The alternative would be for the notice to trump 
overreaching, i.e. provision could be made for a notice to protect a trust (assuming an 
amendment had been made to s 33 Land Registration Act 2002) which would prevent 
overreaching in the event of a disposition by two trustees, effectively abandoning 
overreaching where notices were registered under such conditions.  The disadvantage of such 
a proposal is that it might be said that it would result in the clogging up of the register and 
lead us back to the pre-1925 position. However, there are reasons for being optimistic that 
this would not happen59 and experience in other jurisdictions has not led such an outcome, 
albeit for a range of unrelated reasons, due to different local circumstances. In section 2.2 
below, we discuss how a similar result could be achieved by way of consent restrictions.  
                                                          
58 APP.L.R.12/02.  
59 Section 77 LRA 2002 provides for the payment of damages as a consequence of entries being entered on the 
register without reasonable cause.  
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It is proposed that this new form of protection would be a voluntary option, and confined to 
residential property.60 In view of the fact that this proposal should only extend to residential 
properties, it will be appreciated that in such situations trusts are commonly implied and not 
express in nature. Therefore, a beneficiary may not have the requisite knowledge to protect 
the interest. It is suggested that this could be addressed by having a question at some 
convenient point in the conveyancing process, e.g., as to whether contributions are to be 
made by a third party who would need be notified of their rights 
If neither of these reform options were to find favour, then the other alternative would be to 
consider controlling the overreaching mechanism through modifications to the existing suite 
of available land registry restrictions, which are considered next. 
2. Restrictions 
In part II of the article we concluded that the concept of overreaching is one which is worth 
preserving in England and Wales. So far, in this part of the article, we have considered 
proposals for the realignment of the overreaching doctrine by means of providing for trusts to 
be capable of registration by way of notice under s 33 Land Registration Act 2002. However, 
an alternative scheme can be proposed based upon different forms of restrictions, and in this 
regard we need to consider whether overreaching should be modified by way of an alternative 
new form of restriction which is considered next. 
2.1 Regulating the overreaching defence mechanism by way of better restrictions but 
preserving overreaching 
                                                          
60 Trusts arise in a myriad of situations, not just residential–discretionary trusts; commercial situations where 
property is held under a bare trust by a nominee; and a security trustee registered as a mortgagee on behalf of a 
consortium of lenders. The reason for limiting the protection to residential transactions is because this option 
would not be attractive in the situations just outlined.  
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At present, the only limited form of protection available to a beneficiary is to enter a 
restriction. One way in which a beneficiary under a trust can currently ‘protect’ his 
interest is to enter a Form A restriction.61 Capital monies have to be paid to at least two 
trustees or a trust corporation in order to enable overreaching to take place before a 
disposition by the trustees can operate. However, there are other forms of restriction: the 
current Land Registration Rules 2003 contain a raft of standard form restrictions which 
might be appropriate for a particular beneficiary. Additional ‘protection’ may be afforded 
by entry of a restriction in Form ǀǀ but this will not prevent overreaching. The rationale for 
this type of restriction is to provide a mechanism whereby a beneficiary is given notice of 
adealing after it has taken place. It is important to note that it does not prevent 
overreaching.  
Therefore, if there is a shortfall, the beneficiary would have to pursue a remedy through 
alternative casues of action, and ‘ each of these actions has its own limitations.’ 62 This takes 
us back to the point made in section 2 of part III of this article concerning English 
pragmatism. Restrictions were introduced to allow overreaching to take place, ostensibly for 
the ‘protection’ of beneficiaries. However, Flegg  demonstrated how this protection can be 
illusory. 
The Land Registry could be asked to produce a new standard form of restriction tailored to 
prevent a situation in Flegg arising without the beneficiary having an opportunity of being 
heard on a disposition which might defeat his or her interest. For example, a new form of 
restriction could be included providing that on a disposition the purchaser would be obliged 
to provide full financial details of the transaction to the beneficiary before registration could 
                                                          
61 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notices-restrictions-and-the-protection-of-third-party-
interests-in-the-register-/practice-guide-19-notice-restrictions. Paras, 3.4.4 ; 6.4 and 7.34. Accessed 31 January 
2016.  In fact the Registrar must enter a restriction when two proprietors are entered on the register, see LRA  s 
44(1). 
62 McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield, Land Law, Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford, 2015), p 673.  
25 
 
take place. The beneficiary would then be given a period of time to assess whether there 
would be sufficient equity in the property following overreaching to satisfy his or her interest. 
Any contentious cases would fall to be determined by the Property Chamber of the Upper 
Tribunal. In cases in which there would be sufficient equity demonstrated, overreaching 
would take place.  
2.2 Regulating the overreaching defence mechanism by way of restrictions which would 
effectively abandon overreaching 
Another alternative would be to create more robust forms of restriction; e.g. requiring the 
consent of the beneficiary, or someone on behalf of the beneficiary, before a disposition by 
the trustees could be registered. This would, have the effect of abandoning overreaching 
when such restrictions were entered63 
The Land Registry could effectively abandon overreaching by providing for consent 
restrictions which would mean that a transaction could not proceed without the beneficiary’s 
consent and any cases of difficulty could be referred to the court. This solution would have 
provided a complete defence to the parents in Flegg had they been able to avail themselves of 
it. Further, s 77 Land Registration Act 2002 should ensure that beneficiaries would not enter 
restrictions frivolously. However, the objection to this suggestion in the context of 
overreaching is that it provides too much power in favour of the owner of the static security 
at the expense of dynamic security, and the Law Commission does not currently have any 
appetite for a proposal along these lines. 64  A similar objection could be voiced concerning 
the proposal for the provision of notices which would trump overreaching. However, the 
                                                          
63 Goymour, ‘Mistaken Registration of Land: Exploding the Myth of “ Title by Registration”’ [2013] CLJ 617, 
pp 647-8. 
64 Law Commission, Updating the Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 227, 
2016) [paras. 10.43 and 10.47], p 210. 
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argument in favour of the registration of trusts by way of a notice should be seen as part of a 
wider debate on the registration of trusts which goes beyond the topic of overreaching.  
                                                             CONCLUSION 
Having considered the defence mechanism of overreaching in both its historical and modern 
contexts, we can see that in trying to achieve the correct balance between dynamic and static 
security, successive legislators sought to achieve fairness in favour of the owners of 
beneficial interests under trusts, i.e., the right to be heard on a disposition which could defeat 
their interests. As we have seen, this was a key feature which was captured in the Declaration 
of Title Acts 1862, as evidenced by the provision in favour of the beneficiary to enter a 
caveat, later to be called a caution. History shows that the ability to enter a caution proved to 
be a contentious issue and by 1919 the idea had been abandoned, but cautions made a return 
in the Land Registration Act 1925. As we have seen, up until the Land Registration Act 2002 
there was some uncertainty as to whether beneficial interests were to be ‘protected’ by way of 
a caution or a restriction. Cautions were effectively abolished by the Land Registration Act 
2002, with the result that thereafter the only way in which a beneficial interest under a trust 
can be ‘protected’ at the present time is by the entry of a restriction.  
This article has shown that one feature which was not at the forefront of the minds of the 
early legislators of land law reform was the need to preserve the interests of beneficiaries in 
their properties from the standpoint of preserving those properties as homes. This was 
because the early attempts at land registration, and indeed the 1925 Law of Property 
legislation itself, was enacted against a socio-economic background in which land was looked 
upon more in the nature of personalty than realty. Consequently, the overreaching machinery 
propounded by Cherry was well suited to such times. Home ownership was much less then 
than it is now. Times have changed; home ownership and mortgage lending patterns are far 
27 
 
different at the beginning of the twenty first century than they were at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, and cases such as Flegg bring this into sharp focus. The Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 has placed more emphasis in disputes about trust property 
on the nature of property as a home. However, as has already been noted in such situations 
the courts still lean in favour of creditor interests.  
As was pointed out in the Introduction, the Law Commission is not considering the specific 
topic of overreaching in connection with its current consultation about land registration 
reform. This is because overreaching straddles both registered and unregistered land, and “[it] 
is governed primarily by provisions in the Law of Property Act 1925.” 65 However, there have 
been calls by stakeholders for the overreaching doctrine to be reviewed, and crucially to 
consider the registration of trusts on the register. 66 
 
There is reason to be optimistic that the Law Commission will consider this issue at some 
point in the future, perhaps in its forthcoming consultation concerning mortgages, as 
overreaching is inextricably linked to that topic. There is growing evidence to suggest that the 
question of the registration of trusts as a solution to some of the problems with the doctrine of 
overreaching is something which might be considered by the Law Commission in the 
future.67 This article has sought to address that issue, and has put forward certain suggestions. 
However, as this article has endeavoured to show, it may well be that registration of trusts 
should be considered as a discrete topic and not just in connection with overreaching. There 
can be no doubt that there is growing evidence to suggest that there should be more 
transparency in business dealings generally, and debates about the future of the overreaching 
                                                          
65 Law Commission, Updating the Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 227, 
2016), [1.20] 
66 Ibid.,[1.21]. 
67 Ibid., [1.20]. 
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doctrine, and the issue of trust registration in particular, should be seen in the context of that 
wider debate. 68 While debates concerning trust registration continue, the reform of the 
overreaching defence through modifications to restrictions might be viewed as a desirable 
reform proposal. The matter could be reviewed at a later date once the debates about trust 
registration in this jurisdiction become a little clearer.  
Turning to the two questions posed in the Introduction, in summary we conclude that: (1) the 
concept of overreaching should not be abandoned in England and Wales in its entirety and 
should continue to exist in a modified form, as has been contended in the article, i.e. it would 
apply where a notice which would trump overreaching had not been entered. This proposal is 
made against the background of wider debates in respect of the registration of trusts which go 
beyond the specific topic of overreaching.  An alternative based on the Australian and 
Canadian caveat systems, as we have seen, could result in the loss of the beneficial interest if 
the beneficiary failed to enter a caveat, which would overly favour dynamic security at the 
expense of static security.69 For the reasons set out in this article, the authors do not consider 
the Irish model to be a suitable alternative in this jurisdiction either; (2) (a) we have argued 
that there is a need for reforming the overreaching doctrine. Hard cases such as Flegg do 
matter and it is likely that their numbers will increase rather than decrease. The law, as it 
stands, is clearly against people who might find themselves in the position of the Fleggs, and  
such people might well be suffering in silence; (b) we propose that the time has come for the 
curtain principle to be breached and to allow for the registration of trusts by way of a simple 
amendment to s 33(a) of the Land Registration Act 2002. This proposal is aligned to current 
calls for transparency in business dealings. From the sources cited in this article, it has been 
                                                          
68 Ibid., [1.22]. 
69 It should be noted that in England and Wales if the beneficiary were not in actual occupation and a sole 
trustee sells, the beneficiary’s interest in the property will be postponed to the purchaser’s interest. Therefore, in 
this jurisdiction, it is not always the case that a beneficiary’s interest survives whenever overreaching fails. For a 
recent discussion on this point, see Haque v Khan [2016] EWHC 1950 (Ch). For a recent case concerning 
overriding interests and overreaching, see Mortgage Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555. 
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the practitioners who have been engaging more with this issue, and academic lawyers need to 
enter the debate. In the meantime, we suggest an additional restriction to the current suite of 
land registry restrictions set out in section 2.1 in part III of the article. The proposal for the 
registration of beneficial interests would not only promote legal certainty and align UK 
practices with more modern trends, but it would also serve the added goal of promoting 
transparency in line with other areas such as money laundering; combating use of charitable 
vehicles for use in terrorist financing; and transparency in public tendering. In other words, 
the present regime is out of step with current trends in making business dealings more 
transparent, and bringing transparency to the registration of trusts would represent a major 
step forward. Until the issues in that debate become clearer, it is suggested that the alternative 
proposal set out in section 2.1 of part III of the article is a practical proposal at the present 
time. 
It is nearly thirty years since the reform of overreaching was last considered by the Law 
Commission,70 and it is suggested that the time has come to revisit the topic. 
                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 Law Commission, Transfer of Land: Overreaching: Beneficiaries in Occupation (HMSO, 1989), Law Com. 
No. 188. 
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